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Abstract
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the security
environment in the Western world has changed consider-
ably. Threat perception and risk management are being
reassessed, and the word “security” has acquired an added
relevance in the political agenda. This paper addresses a
particular derivation of the concept of security, which is
human security, from the perspective of refugee protection
and human rights of the individual, assessing the advan-
tages and disadvantages, together with the possible uses
and misuses of the notion in the post-September 11 con-
text. In particular, it deals with the question of what has
changed that could demand greater attention in crafting a
human security regime, which may in specific regions be
inclusive of some but exclusive of others. It concludes by
cautioning against a drift of the concept towards incorpo-
rating too many different elements that may be used per-
versely and against the interests of refugees.
Résumé
À la suite des attentats du 11 septembre, l’environnement
en matière de sécurité a considérablement changé dans le
monde occidental. La perception des menaces et la ges-
tion du risque ont acquis une nouvelle pertinence dans
l’agenda politique. Cet article examine un aspect particu-
lier de la notion de sécurité, c.à-d. la sécurité humaine,
du point de vue de la protection des réfugiés et des droits
de la personne de chaque individu. Il tente d’en évaluer
les avantages et les inconvénients, aussi bien que les us-
ages et abus possibles dans le contexte de l’après 11 sep-
tembre. Plus spécifiquement, il lance une réflexion sur la
question de savoir ce qui a changé dans ce nouvel univers
qui demanderait plus d’attention afin qu’on puisse façon-
ner un régime de sécurité humaine qui, dans certaines
régions, inclurait certains groupes et en exclurait d’au-
tres. L’article conclut avec une mise en garde contre une
dérive de la notion pour inclure trop d’éléments dispa-
rates qui pourraient être utilisés d’une manière perverse
et contre les intérêts des réfugiés.
S
ince the end of the Cold War, and in particular in the
mid-1990s, after a succession of violent  crises that
resulted in the death of thousands of civilians, the
concept of human security came to light with a strong moral
stance and a project of responsabilization of the interna-
tional community for the fate of the victims of conflicts, as
well as for a host of other problems that degraded the human
condition. Already in the 1970s there were significant at-
tempts to create better standards of living worldwide
through the project of the New International Economic
Order (NIEO), but these were eventually replaced in the
1980s by neo-liberal economics.1 The concept of human
security emerged in  the 1990s as a  renewed attempt to
increase the well-being of the individual at all levels, taking
the emphasis away from the traditional defence-oriented,
statist view of security.
The post-September 11 environment raises new chal-
lenges in the international system, regarding not only the
traditional concept of security, but also the construction of
the concept of human security. This article is interested in
understanding how the concept of human security shapes
the panorama of refugee protection and what has changed
in this new world that could call for greater attention in
crafting a human security regime. It is argued that Septem-
ber 11 emphasized a number of existing ambivalences and
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a mixture of antagonistic forces of closure and openness: a
combination of the post-Cold War trend of universalism
and world politics with a renewed state-centrism on the one
hand, and an apparent increasing incompatibility between
human rights and internal security on the other hand.2
The resurgence of the notion of “internal security” rein-
forces its already problematic relation with “human secu-
rity.” The random development of the latter concept may
leave it open to different interpretations, which derive too
much from the intended goals of most of its promoters.
Depending on its positive or negative framing, “human
security” in the post-September 11 environment may re-
verse the present tendency to associate anti-terrorism poli-
cies with diminishing refugee protection, thus increasing
concern for refugees, or it may contribute to consolidating
the forces of closure and emphasize the dynamics of inclu-
sion/exclusion.
The article proceeds first with a critical overview of
different approaches to security, without attempting to
provide one definition, and focusing on the dimension of
the concept that impinges on the issue of refugee protection
and on how it can be framed. It then provides an account
of the role of the concept of human security in the interna-
tional system and of how refugee protection is conceived in
the same system, before and after September 11. Finally it
concentrates on the specific impact of the terrorist attacks
on refugee protection and the actual and potential role of
the concept of human security in such context.
The Emergence of the Concept of Human Security
Multiplicity of Approaches
The concept of security originated in foreign policy. Initially
it concerned protection of national territory and population,
the main attributes of the state. In some countries it evolved
into a foreign policy option that overcame the militaristic
sense of security based on an anarchic international system,
and took on a humanitarian dimension.3 In other countries
the reconceptualization was part of comprehensive defence
reviews that shifted security to an internal level as a result of
generalized internal violence.4
The first significant references to “human security” ap-
pear in the early 1990s, at the origins of the Common
Security Forum (CSF), an international research centre,
whose aim is to explore economic, political,  and  other
conceptions of security and which promotes dialogue
among academics, governments, and institutions doing
research on global security issues.5 In addition, several
other institutions actively promote the concept; these in-
clude the Human Security Network; Commission on
Global Governance; the Global Environmental Change and
Human Security Project; and the Commission on Human
Security.
Several initiatives at the level of international organiza-
tions such as NATO, the World Bank, and in particular the
UN, have also contributed to bringing about and promot-
ing the concept of human security. Namely, the UN Secre-
tary-General’s Agenda for Peace focused on the impact of
the end of the Cold War on international security and
promoted an integrative approach to human security.6 The
most significant UN initiative so far has been the 1993
UNDP Human Development Report,7 proposing a concept
of human security based on the pillars of freedom from fear
and freedom from want. The threats identified were
grouped into seven main categories: economic, food,
health, environment, personal, community, and political.
“Human security,” as has been framed by these actors
and institutions, entails the logic of universal rights to
minimum standards of life, placing the individual instead
of the state as the referent object of security and at the centre
of concern not only regarding physical security but also
regarding  economic, social, environmental, and human
rights security. This extended framework has been empha-
sized in particular in the context of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose populations
of concern have been increasingly deprived of the mini-
mum standards of security in situations of conflict and of
mass displacement.8 This has led the former High Commis-
sioner, Sadako Ogata, to endorse the concept of human
security, with strong support from the government of Ja-
pan. In her own words: “Refugee protection is a set of legal
instruments, operational activities and material contribu-
tions that can restore a sense of security in people whom
flight has deprived of everything. . . .”9 This is in line with
the integrative conception of human security and the pro-
motion of a link from relief to development in refugee
protection and conflict situations. In the context of refugee
protection, human security becomes particularly useful for
advocacy purposes since it overcomes the limits set by a
strict interpretation of the UNHCR’s mandate as it inte-
grates all categories of people, whether formally refugees or
not. However, the use of the concept is riddled with am-
bivalence deriving from the need to combine human rights
concerns with state interests.10
Universalism and indivisibility of “human security” are
two of the main characteristics of the concept. The ambi-
tion of universalism aims at going beyond the idea of
state-centred world politics where each state is responsible
for the security of its territory and population, by placing
the responsibility for all individuals at the level of the
international community, and coordinating the efforts and
activities at the level of different types of actors.11 The
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importance of the individual as holder of universal rights,
among them that of security, is illustrated by the increasing
number of legal rules directed at individuals rather than
states.12
In the same logic of universalism and indivisibility, some
approaches to “human security” develop conceptions that
aspire to being general models, more or less applicable to
any society in the world. Bajpai suggests an audit of human
security in the line of the human development audit carried
out annually by UNDP, which would assess the conditions
of safety and freedom of individuals measured by direct and
indirect threats to security and by the capacity of the deci-
sion-making structures (i.e., not only states) to deal with
such threats.13
This conception is rooted in the idea that human security
is indeed a universal and objective quality of social life,
where the different components are integrated and indivis-
ible. Although in ideological terms very valuable, there are
problems with this approach in that it would need a very
clearly delimited concept definition and also the assign-
ment of structures responsible for and capable of enforcing
such human security standards and which could be made
accountable for such a role. In Bajpai’s framework respon-
sibility is attributed to state, sub-state and non-state actor
levels and therefore removed from the sole state-centred
responsibility, which has the effect of dispersing account-
ability. Further, it may be used to legitimize declaring cer-
tain groups as having acceptable levels of “human security,”
when not all indicators are considered or at the same level,
since such measurement would always be focused on a
number of specific items. This would in turn legitimize
increasingly restrictive refugee policies and take even more
responsibility away from the international community of
states.14
The ambition of universalism has also been contested by
authors who argue that the concept of human security is
not universal but rather a Western construction15 and that
appropriating the nation-state-based security model for use
in regions with a different history and culture may add to
the problems instead of solving them.16 Indeed, many di-
mensions that “human security” encompasses are cultural
and context-dependent. Thus, as Lipschutz puts it, security
is an “intersubjective phenomenon” rather than an objec-
tive condition, and different regions construct it differ-
ently.17
Other criticisms of the human security concept, in par-
ticular the UNDP version, argue that it is too vague, not
objectively measurable and too woolly, too encompassing
and lacking specification.18 The concept of human security
is still in evolution and not only academics but also policy
makers and activists should consider carefully the nature of
their positions and possible implications when promoting
their ideas.19
Dissecting human security
There is an intense debate regarding the nature of the con-
cept of security,20 how it should be conceptualized, and in
particular regarding the advantages and disadvantages of
widening it.21
Waever draws attention to the “securitizing” dimension
of the concept of security and to the fact that broadening
should not be made without considering the political im-
plications and the historical connotations that the concept
of security bears. For him the referent object is still the state,
and “. . . addressing an issue in security terms still evokes
an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an impor-
tant role in addressing it. . .”22 which, according to the
author, is not always an improvement.
Conceiving security as a social construction, the con-
structivist perspective posits the existence of a normative
dilemma in securitizing immigration and refugee issues.
According to Huysmans, by taking security away from the
state and to the societal, private, or individual level we run
the risk of delegitimizing not only the state but also of
legitimizing nationalistic and xenophobic reactions.23
Lipschutz demonstrates how important the state-centric
differentiation between the self and the enemy is for secu-
rity as a discourse and points to the post-Cold War diffi-
culty of finding new enemies.24 In the present context, one
should caution that just as a new significant enemy has been
found – “terrorism” – so also the contestable nature of what
a terrorist is may induce confusion with refugees and lead
to their construction as enemies or at least elements to be
excluded from the newly threatened and insecure societies.
The important elements in assessing human security are
not just the concept in itself, but how and in which context
it is framed,25 and which other concepts are associated with
it. At the current stage of loose definition of “human secu-
rity,” the attached concepts are the determining factors in
providing the framing and the referent object. I suggest that
depending on the framing process and on the ideological
association with other concepts and referent objects, “hu-
man security” will take on a positive or a negative value as
far as human rights values and refugee protection aspects
are concerned.
In the literature, the concept of human security oscillates
from a focus on states26 as referent object, to a focus on
individuals27 and on society.28 Focusing  on the framing
ideologies, I would here propose a differentiation within
the concept of human security itself, i.e., that of human
security and human insecurity. I suggest that the intended
interpretation of “human security” as an ideological project
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is associated with human rights and world governance
conceptions, while “human insecurity” is associated with
internal security and state-centric conceptions of the inter-
national system.
In the context of refugee protection different ideological
projects that use the term “human security” may have
distinct referent objects, which define which security is at
stake: in the case of human insecurity the referent object is
the citizen of a particular community (citizen security from
external threats), while in the case of human security it is
the refugee (refugee security). These distinctions are in-
tended to provide analytical clarity and help delimit the
boundaries of what is conceived as human security.
Human security and human insecurity. The main ele-
ment in this distinction is the qualification of positive and
negative security. The broadened concept of security, in
particular the human security version, entails a positive
conception of security in the sense of an absence of threats
to the well-being and quality of life, whereas other concep-
tions of security rely much more on the very construction
of those threats. This negative dimension I will call human
insecurity. Eriksson develops a theory of threat politics,
which includes two main dimensions: framing and societal
salience. Both threats and risks are seen as social construc-
tions and the politics of framing are seen as an important
instrument of power.29
Here we conceive of human security and human insecu-
rity in opposing terms in order to highlight the essentially
contradictory terms in which the concept “human security”
can be framed. Human security is then associated in nor-
mative terms with efforts to promote global governance
and universal well-being without the intention of con-
structing threats (insecurity), but of promoting their ab-
sence (security), namely through the association with
human rights. On the other hand, “human insecurity” is
more closely  associated with  the  promotion  of internal
security in exclusionary terms.
A. “Human security” and human rights. The low enforce-
ment of first-generation human rights in the world has to
some extent kept the refugee regime going, despite increas-
ing reluctance of Western states to admit refugees and a
selective application of humanitarian funds and resources
which has been to a great extent dependent on the media
impact and Western interests in specific emergencies. Re-
garding second-generation human rights, the situation has
been even worse, with states unwilling to provide funds for
reconstruction of societies, or for the promotion of eco-
nomic and social conditions for development.
“Human security” appears as a way to push forward the
two generations of rights and link them with a strong
agenda, namely the proposal of the creation of an Economic
Security Council.30 The problem, as pointed out by some
observers, is that sometimes it is difficult to establish a
distinction between “securitarian” ideology and human
rights since often the discourses are not very far from each
other, often sharing the same vision of what is “insecure,”
and only differing regarding the proposed solutions. Hence
the need for due contextualization of alternative discourses
such as critical security and human rights in relation to the
dominant one.31 Further, moving the discourse of refugee
protection from the realm of human rights to that of secu-
rity risks not only operates a switch in perspectives and
wordings, but also changes the focus from the refugees to
the receiving state.32
B. “Human insecurity” and internal security. There are
two types of “human insecurity” that may affect refugee
protection: the fear of terrorism and the fear of “invasions”
of migrants who enter illegally and abuse the asylum sys-
tem.33 As it is difficult to establish whom the terrorists are,
an artificial “inside/outside” or “inclusion/exclusion”
framework34 is established that impacts particularly on
refugees and asylum seekers.
The construction of security entails a construction of risk
perceptions, which also depends on the different social
groups: one group in particular, the individualistic, is likely
to see increasing refugee numbers as a threat, depending on
their positive or negative impact on economic growth.35 In
this  case, people,  or the  polity, feel  threatened  in  their
“well-being” by the presence of so many immigrants and
by the uncontrollable nature of their arrival and presence
in the territory.
Human security and citizen security. Instead of displac-
ing the referent object from state security to human secu-
rity, a “human insecurity” framing turns the citizen into the
referent object,36 in “an attempt to generate a democratic
and participatory response to the thorny issue of protection
and repression.”37 Although citizen security and logics of
public order and safety refer to something different than
common approaches to human security, it is a fact that such
exclusionary logics can easily appropriate the concept, due
to a perceived absence of state capacity to uphold public
order. That is to some extent related to a certain feeling of
impotence of Western states regarding their capacity to
determine who is admitted into the country, which in-
creases the likelihood of restrictions on those that resort to
the asylum system: “In a world of risk this is an area where
states perhaps believe they can, either individually or col-
lectively, continue to be assertive.”38
According to Harvey one should look at the constitutive
principles of democratic polities to understand the poten-
tial for contradiction between what we call citizen security
and the security of “others”: “The treatment of asylum-
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seekers brings to the fore a tension between notions of
democratic citizenship and ‘borderless’ strains of liberalism
that are anchored in the idea that rights attach to the
person.”39 Even if these two are not in themselves irrecon-
cilable, the risk is that they are framed as such, in particular
when individual welfare and the presence of refugees are
perceived as incompatible, as is the worrying case in many
countries in Europe and in Australia.40
Human security and refugee security. Here lies the main
problem with the referent object: whose “refugee security”?
Is it security from refugees, or is it security of refugees? The
debate persists about whether to consider refugee move-
ments as “human security threats.”
Although Suhrke does not discard the security paradigm
as inappropriate for migration, she cautions against a hasty
classification of population displacements as a human se-
curity threat.41 Zimmermann enumerates a number of cate-
gories of threats “. . . posed by migration to a stable and
productive world order”: spill-over of refugee crises; severe
persecution of minorities; destabilization of states; failed
states; technological sources such as landmines; root
causes.42 Also Weiner has identified five broad categories of
ways in which migratory movements can threaten security:
when refugees and migrants are working against the regime
of their home country; when they pose a risk to their host
country; when immigrants are seen as a cultural threat;
when they are perceived as a social or economic threat;
when the host country uses immigrants as instruments to
threaten the country of origin.43
In this case the referent object of security is clearly the
host society. But is it a human security threat? Treated in
the sense of a threat, it is rather a societal44 or international
security threat, or human insecurity. Treated in the sense
of ensuring protection to those displaced it is human security.
Here is the ambivalence of framing possibilities and contexts.
Whitaker underlines the political significance of the
scare of refugee tides in the  immediate  post-Cold War
context “. . . in a world where the ‘refugee’ has been under
reconstruction as an object of popular anxiety and aver-
sion.”45 Indeed, the major problem is when one speaks of
refugees in the context of “human security threats,”46 which
leads to the idea that something else is threatened. In fact
what causes the population movement is a lack of human
security (if the referent object is the migrants and not
others), but the expression may end up being interpreted
in the sense that we here conceive as “human insecurity,”
i.e., that the movements themselves are threats. In the most
general formulation, they can constitute human security
threats if their massive presence destabilizes the host soci-
ety, and even the Security Council designates such move-
ments as threats to international peace and stability.
The Conceptualization of “Human Security” and
of Refugee Protection in the Contemporary
International System
The Ambivalent International System
For analytical purposes, the post-Cold War world can be
characterized by the coexistence of two different types of
structures: a state-centric one based on the Westphalian
conceptions of states as autonomous and independent ter-
ritorial units, and a world system based on post-statist con-
ceptions of world governance and an emphasis on the
individual as the central unit of concern. Despite consid-
erable progress in establishing the rudiments of an inter-
national polity through the development of international
institutions,47 the international system is increasingly char-
acterized by a strong degree of uncertainty and instability.48
While this has led to a tendency for the erosion of sover-
eignty,49 it has at the same time contributed to a less clear
notion of where responsibilities lie for issues that have been
put on the international agenda. Also an increasing number
of non-state actors with significant influence in the inter-
national system contribute to this disaggregation.50 One
consequence of removing responsibilities for protection
away from a state-centric framework may be that no entity
is held accountable any more. This “upgrading” of humani-
tarian rights to the “cosmopolitan” sphere51 has already led
to a significant degree of carelessness by states – which in
the end retain most of the funding power – regarding the
protection of refugees, with the argument that they are
protected in their territories by some international institu-
tion.52 If the state has its responsibilities removed, and on
top of that it has a chance to appropriate the human security
discourse to security issues that suit internal political goals,
then refugee protection is worse off. In this context, the
concept of human security falls prey to the dominating
tendencies in the international system, which is charac-
terized by the coexistence of contradictory  forces53 that
belong to  different framing processes of  the world and
international politics.
At the same time, the refugee protection regime has been
increasingly undermined  by  state  policies that  promote
closure rather than openness and by lack of political will to
keep their commitment to the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees. There is a return to the state-centric
framework as a reaction to globalization and to the effect of
mass migration, which has been an ongoing trend and “. . .
has engendered a growing sense of exposure or vulnerabil-
ity to what had previously seemed distant and inconsequen-
tial.”54 It has also resulted in “. . . a more tightly regulated
public space for the marginalized.”55 This trend, which is
underpinned by the notion of internal security, has since
September 11 been emphasized by the reaction to terrorism.
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Actors and Institutional Aspects
As politics is about choices and priorities there has been a
need to prioritize certain pressing human rights concerns
and bring them into the international agenda with a renewed
emphasis. This was done by attempting to bridge the needs
and problems of the poor and destitute with the interests of
states and thus the concept of human security joined the
normative with the pragmatic approach.
Several UN officials have been trying to promote a vision
of human security based on human rights norms, in par-
ticular second-generation rights, which were not cherished
by some countries, including the U.S.56 Thus a broad and
integrative concept of human security was developed.
NGOs and civil society in general have also had a prominent
role in helping the UN disseminate the concept of human
security, in particular by promoting research on the issue.57
Despite the moral motivations of these actors, it is clear that
many of these approaches were stimulated both by institu-
tional ambitions of promoting grand visions of new con-
cepts58 and by the need to attract funds and resources for
new issues.59
A number of countries have also significantly contrib-
uted to the emergence of the new concept; among them the
most prominent were Norway, Canada, and Japan. Other
countries, such as South Africa, have developed their own
notions of human security. However, among the countries
that actively promoted human security there are significant
divergences. While South Africa has a clear internal version
of human security, Norway, Canada, and Japan, in their
program of “middle-power foreign policy,” are more pre-
disposed towards the foreign policy dimension of the con-
cept. But even among the latter there are distinctions, since
Canada emphasizes a more humanitarian type of human
security, based on first-generation human rights, while
Japan emphasizes more the economic dimension, i.e., sec-
ond-generation human rights.60
According to Baldwin, most of the efforts to redefine
security
. . . are more concerned with redefining the policy agendas of
nation-states than with the concept of security itself. Such pro-
posals are usually buttressed with a mixture of normative argu-
ments about which values of which people or groups of people
should be protected, and empirical arguments as to the nature
and magnitude of threats to those values.61
However, the extent of security review and revision since
the 1990s has varied tremendously.62 While in the United
States and Western Europe not much has changed, the
so-called “middle powers” have operated more profound
reviews and policy revisions. Also many former Soviet-bloc
states and democratizing developing countries, including
South Africa, have been obliged to fundamentally re-exam-
ine their security assumptions.
The latter has undergone one of the most comprehensive
defence and security reviews in the developing world, much
of which was a result of the military’s ambition for task
expansion.63 Securitizing an issue can be a way of legitimiz-
ing the appropriation and manipulation of new issue-areas
by the power holders.64 Abiri analyzes the cases of securiti-
zation of cross-border migration in Sweden and Malawi
and concludes that in both cases it was used as a channel
for political purposes: “In Malawi, the securitization is
carried out as a way to consolidate democratic rule, while
in Sweden it is used as a way to recapture faith in politics.”65
Indeed, political and institutional aspects are very im-
portant in explaining the way the concept of human secu-
rity is framed and used. In some cases it becomes clear that
there are significant institutional divisions within the gov-
ernments of states, and it is expected that such tension
occurs between ministries of foreign affairs with foreign
policies that are active in human rights, and in particular in
the promotion of human security, and ministries of inter-
nal affairs that are concerned about the protection of the
citizens. Evidence in Canada shows that there isn’t much
inter-ministerial agreement regarding the definition and
use of human security.66
A final issue of concern in the present international
system, which requires caution and a clear delimitation of
the concept  of  “human security” by activists as well as
academics and decision makers, is the rise in right-wing and
even extremist anti-immigration parties that use any kind
of rhetoric to pursue their political purposes.
The Impact of the Terrorist Attacks on “Human
Security” and Refugee Protection
The September 11 attacks were an overwhelming event not
only for the magnitude of the crime and appalling nature of
the act and of its planning, but also for its symbolic nature.
The events led not only observers but also decision makers
and politicians to reconsider the state of world politics. The
attacks led to an abrupt and unprecedented state of emer-
gency, where exceptional security measures were enforced,
which had immediate impact on refugee policy and legisla-
tion – although in some countries more than others – and
may have an impact on how refugees are perceived in the
different countries regarding security constraints, not only
in the short but also in the long run.
Many countries introduced restrictive measures, includ-
ing front-end security screening for all asylum-seekers im-
mediately upon their arrival at land-borders and airports.67
The U.S. initially ground to a halt and then reduced its
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resettlement program drastically,68 creating an enormous
backlog and risking undermining the whole refugee reset-
tlement structure.69 After the attacks on the U.S., the gov-
ernment adopted new and unprecedented immigration
legislation in an expedited manner on September 26,70 and
soon after tried to impose specific measures in the frame-
work of counterterrorist co-operation with the EU,71 and
also tried to impose the “perimeter continental security” on
Canada.72 This reflects a worrying policy of internationali-
zation of the “state of exception.”73
In a very interesting critique of the expansive definition
of security, Jayasuriya claims that the new debate extends
U.S. “law and order” to the transnational arena. In her own
words, these developments “. . . reinforce the emergence of
a new form of the regulatory state that has the ‘securitiza-
tion of civil society’ as a key governance strategy. In fact, it
is possible to see in some aspects of these developments the
‘internationalization of the state of exception’ that Neu-
mann so brilliantly analyzed.”74
Whitaker also points out the degree of institutionaliza-
tion of international co-operation promoted by the U.S. to
combat terrorism, which “. . . rests upon certain consensual
definitions of the nature of the threat.”75 Terrorism is a
contestable concept and a clear definition is also hard to
come by.76 Further, as Bigo points out, there is a danger of
overexpanding the concept of “terrorist” to the ridiculous
extent of including youth demonstrators in the same lot as
Bin Laden. The same observer criticizes the justification of
security measures aimed at limiting immigration and asy-
lum on the grounds of the insecurity situation created by
the attacks and calls for a study of the impact of these new
measures on a range of issues.77
In Germany, advocacy groups reported that efforts to
include adequate human rights safeguards for refugees in
proposed asylum legislation suffered a serious setback in
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks with many view-
ing the new legislation as a necessary measure to strengthen
national security.78 In Greece, Afghan refugees who arrived
after the September 11 attacks received a hostile reception
as the government refused to allow them to apply for asy-
lum, violating its obligations under the Refugee Conven-
tion. In Hungary, all Afghan asylum seekers were
transferred from open reception centres to facilities with
heightened security measures.
One of the immediate effects was a reappearance of the
word “security,” used in very narrow terms.79 The main
issues of concern are the restrictiveness of how asylum law
and entry  regulations are applied, but in particular the
legitimation of situations of detention at borders and sig-
nificant increases in deportations.80 These, as well as other
measures that go well beyond counterterrorism, have been
justified with the need to maintain internal security, and
there is very little concern for clarifying that refugees should
not be seen as threats to such security. However, in many
countries, not only in the U.S. but also Europe and Austra-
lia, ethnic and minority groups such as Afghan refugees and
Muslim immigrants were termed “terrorists”.81
Uncertainty of the whole counterterrorist process leads
to what Whitaker calls a “. . . definitional stew of disparate
elements,” where refugee claimants submitting to security
screening for terrorist connections face a real-life lottery,
with uncertain rules and unpredictable results.82 While the
increased use of confidential information without regard
for data protection requirements is applied with the justi-
fication of internal security against terrorism, it may well
be used against the interests of legitimate refugees.83
After the attacks on the Twin Towers, civil-rights organi-
zations immediately called attention to the idea that the
fight against terrorism should not serve to justify repression
and argued for advancing human development as one of
the main principles to pursue in response, including the
concepts used by UNDP for expanding human security,
such as freedom from fear and freedom from want.84 Thus,
not all outcomes of policy changes have been bad, and there
seems to be a new impetus for promoting economic devel-
opment and sustainability, in other words, a sufficient de-
gree of “human security” that will at least prevent certain
parts of the world from being so desperate. The future will
tell whether the present commitments will last and translate
into  effective  policies, but the international community
should at least make sure that they don’t serve to legitimize
exclusionary policies of other type. Further, the perceptions
of newcomers, namely refugees, as a threat is not merely a
post-September 11 event. Already before that, such percep-
tion was widespread.85
One of the most serious problems of internal security
against terrorism that affects refugee protection is that
asylum is political, and the acceptability or not of particular
migrants is dependent on the relation of the host country
with the country of origin, as there is always the fear that
the refugee may use the host country as a base for eventual
terrorist activities.86 There is also the problem that the
country of origin may have a distorted notion of “terrorist,”
which makes it politically difficult for the host country to
accept those who duly should receive protection from per-
secution for having wanted to restore democratic values in
the country of origin.
In sum, the terrorist attacks emphasized the contradic-
tion between internal security and human rights and clearly
made refugee security more difficult. These contradictions
were present at the internal level, as exemplified in the
Canadian government’s way of dealing with the issue: while
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in internal affairs the reaction was to reinsure the security
of the citizens, in the foreign office there was more concern
to emphasize the need to respect the rights of the refugees.
As pointed out above, the terrorist attacks but also, I
would argue, an ongoing trend of reaction to globalization
have resulted in a generalized resurgence of nationalism,
and this is confirmed by the shift in the strategy of the global
civil society project that is redirecting attention towards
new emphasis on the state as central element of interna-
tional decision making.87
Conclusion
Because the concept of human security is at this stage so
loose and all-encompassing, it can easily turn into a subtle
instrument for justifying restrictions and underlining the
sense of community and internal security,  in particular
when the motivation behind such change has the magnitude
of the September 11 events. Terrorism strengthens the po-
sition  of  those actors who defend a version  of negative
framing of human security through the construction of threats
to internal security and of “human insecurity” notions.
However, in the post-September 11 world one has to
consider not only the immediate and direct effects of the
attacks on the Twin Towers, but also the previous trend of
restrictionism regarding acceptance of refugees and mi-
grants. It is too simplistic to focus exclusively on the impact
of a single overwhelming event although it has significantly
contributed to reinforcing conditions that already preceded
it. Indeed, counterterrorism framings are to a large extent
based on the opposition between refugees and citizens as
referent object of security. The events of September 11 have
a high likelihood of further biasing opinions towards the
criminalization of foreigners, in particular those coming
from specific parts of the world and with a background of
political activism. This is to add to the general attitude of
criminalization of those asylum seekers who are smuggled
into a country in search of protection.
The problem with the human security approach is that
many of those who promote it tend to plunge too easily into
a world politics or cosmopolitan approach, forgetting that
the state still has a fundamental role in international rela-
tions. Here, the importance of the agent who is trying to
bring about a change in the international system is under-
lined: the state is the identifiable criterion by which to judge
whether we are talking about human security or just inter-
nal security, as its institutions have enormous framing
power. Thus, when defining the concept of human security,
the ideological motivations of the framing agent should be
made explicit and delimited. Since it is assumed that human
security as a concept and a human rights program may
work well if it is clearly defined and formulated within a
world politics framework, the current reversal towards the
state as the central element in international relations calls
for careful reflection on the concept’s potential and conse-
quences in particular as far as refugee protection is concerned.
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